

Week 4: Theoretical Entities in the Philosophy of Mind

Plan:

- I. Recap and Follow-up.
 - a. Sellars's account of the use and function of 'looks' talk is:
 - antidescriptivist about appearances, and
 - expressed in a pragmatic metavocabulary.
 - b. Turning Descartes on his head: from cognition to agency.
 - c. Foundationalism: epistemological versus semantic.
Evading the epistemological Agrippan trilemma.

- II. The Myth of Jones.
 - a. Target: Behaviorism.
Argument: Behaviorism is instrumentalism about theoretical entities in the philosophy of mind.
Jones: Thoughts and sense impressions are theoretical entities, not paradigms of observable ones.
 - b. Sellars contra Platonism: The distinction between observable and theoretical objects is not *ontological* but *methodological* and *epistemological*.
 - c. Wittgensteinian and Rylean behaviorism in the philosophy of mind.
 - d. Myth of Jones I: thoughts. Postulated to explain semantic coherence and cogency.
 - e. Myth of Jones II: sense impressions. Postulated to explain systematic perceptual errors.
 - f. Two-ply account of observation: RDRDs with concept-applying responses.
What is observable in that sense.

- III. Phenomenalism.
 - a. Traditional TwenCen phenomenalism:
C.I. Lewis, Carnap in *Aufbau*, Goodman in *Structure of Appearance*.
 - b. Argument from proximity and error-freedom.
World shows up for us "painted in secondary qualities."
 - c. Sellars's argument against subjunctive conditional analysis of objective claims in phenomenalist terms:
 - phenomenalist concepts are not semantically autonomous, and
 - conditionals expressed exclusively in terms of them are not true.
 - d. Constructive pragmatic functionalist account of secondary-quality concepts (from Evans).